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COLLOQUIUM ARTICLES
ASTEROIDS AND COMETS: U.S. AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
LOWEST-PROBABILITY, HIGHEST
I CONSEQUENCE RISK
MICHAEL B. GERRARD AND ANNA W. BARBER*
INTRODUCrION
Asteroids' and comets2 pose unique policy problems. They
are the ultimate example of a low probability, high consequence
event: no one in recorded human history is confirmed to have
ever died from an asteroid or a comet, but the odds are that at
some time in the next several centuries (and conceivably next
year) an asteroid or a comet will cause mass localized destruction
and that at some time in the coming half million years (and con-
ceivably next year), an asteroid or a comet will kill several billion
people. The sudden extinction of the dinosaurs, and most other
species 65 million years ago, is now generally attributed to the
impact of a 10-kilometer-wide comet or asteroid at Chicxulub in
Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula that left a 110-mile-wide crater.3
* Michael B. Gerrard is a partner in the New York office of Arnold &
Porter; a member of the adjunct faculties of Columbia Law School and the Yale
School of Forestry and Environmental Studies; former chair of the Environ-
mental Law Section of the New York State Bar Association; and General Edi-
tor of the six-volume Environmental Law Practice Guide. B.A. 1972, Columbia
College; J.D. 1978, New York University School of Law.
Anna W. Barber is an associate in the New York office of Arnold & Porter
and was a Submissions Editor of the Yale Journal of Regulation. B.A. 1990,
Yale University; J.D. 1995, Yale Law School.
The authors gratefully acknowledge comments on earlier drafts by Andrea
Carusi, Tom Gehrels, David Morrison, and John L. Remo, none of whom are
responsible for remaining errors of fact or judgment.
1 An asteroid is defined as "one of a multitude of objects ranging in size
from sub-km to about 1000 kin, most of which lie between the orbits of Mars
and Jupiter." HAZARDs DUE TO COMETS AND ASTEROIDS 1242 (Tom Gehrels
ed., 1994).
2 A comet is defined as "a diffuse body of gas and solid particles ... which
orbits the sun." Id. at 1245.
3 Thomas Mallon, The Asteroids are Coming! The Asteroids are Comingl,
N.Y. TIMES MAc., July 28, 1996, at 16, 19. See also Luis W. Alvarez et al.,
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Even our own century has seen smaller-scale impacts. On June
30, 1908, hundreds of square miles of trees were burned and
herds of reindeer may have been incinerated in the Tunguska re-
gion of Siberia by an explosion with the force of 1,000 Hiroshima
bombs, apparently caused by a 60-meter asteroid.4 Airborne
blasts in the kiloton to megaton range were observed in 1930 at
the Curuca River in Brazil; in 1947 at Sikhote-Alin, Siberia; in
1965 over Revelstoke, Canada; and over Ontario in 1966 and
Alaska in 1969.5 Most recently, on November 22, 1996, a mete-
orite crashed into a coffee field in Honduras, leaving a 165-foot-
wide crater.6
On March 22, 1989, the asteroid 1989 FC came within about
690,000 kilometers of Earth-a near miss in astronomical
terms-and crossed the Earth's orbit at a place where our planet
had been only six hours before.7 In July 1994, the large frag-
ments of a broken comet, discovered sixteen months earlier by
Gene and Carolyn Shoemaker and David Levy, smashed spec-
tacularly into Jupiter, causing perturbances thousands of miles
across.8 After that incident, one National Aeronautics & Space
Administration (NASA) astronomer reflected:
The solar system no longer seems quite so far away as it did
before July, 1994. Here we are, close to the edge, protected
from the true immensity of the universe by a thin blue line. A
Extraterrestrial Cause for the Cretaceous-Tertiary rtinction, 208 SCIENCE 1095
(1980); Jan Smit, Extinctions at the Cretaceous-Tertiary Bourdary: The Link to
the Chicxulub Impact, in HAZARDS DUE TO COMEMS AND ASTEROIDS, supra
note 1, at 859. See also, The Mass-Extinction Debates: How Science Works in a
Crisis, (William Glen ed., 1994). A recently-advanced theory that the comet or
asteroid struck the Earth at an oblique angle, rather than directly, may answer
some of the remaining questions surrounding the concept. See Steven D'Hondt
& Peter H. Schultz, Cretaceous-Tertiary (Chicxulub) Impact Angle and Its Con-
sequences, 24 GEOLOGY 963 (1996).
4 Vitaly V. Adushkin & Ivan V. Nemchinov, Consequences of Impacts of
Cosmic Bodies on the Surface of the Earth, in HAZARDs Du To Co.mMS AND
ASTEROIDS, supra note 1, at721, 722; Richard Stone, The Last Great Impact on
Earth, DiscovER, Sept. 1996, at 60.
5 Leonard David, Assessing the Threat front Comets and Asteroids, AERO-
SPACE AN., Aug. 1996, at 24; Roy A. Gallant, Siklhote-Alin Fifty Years Later,
SKY & TELESCOPE, Feb. 1997, at 50.
6 November Meteorite Leaves Big Inpression on Honduras, ST. PmiEs.
BURG Tieis, Dec. 17, 1996, at 15A.
7 Clark R. Chapman & David Morrison, Impacts on the Earth by Asteroids
and Comets: Assessing the Hazard, 367 NATURE 33, 36 (1994).
8 THE GREAT CoiET CRASH: THE IMpACT OF COMET SHOEMAgER-LEvy
9 ON JUPrrER (John R. Spencer & Jacqueline Mitton eds., 1995).
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day will surely come when the sheltering sky is torn apart with
a power that begs the imagination. It has happened before.
Ask any dinosaur, if you can find one. This is a dangerous
place. 9
A number of astronomers around the world are now at work
on detection, but the published literature contains little serious
discussion of how our political and legal institutions are to deal
with such a huge but remote threat of asteroids and comets
reaching the Earth's surface. Scientific uncertainty, risk percep-
tion, intergenerational equity, arms control, and a host of other
thorny problems come into play.
Part I of this Article briefly discusses the nature and magni-
tude of this danger, describes current efforts to detect asteroids
and comets that could collide with the Earth, and summarizes the
options if such an object were found. Part II compares this dan-
ger with other hazards to whose prevention our society has al-
ready decided to devote major resources, and describes both the
risks of ignoring the problem and the risks of responding. Part
III explores issues raised under U.S. domestic law in dealing with
the threat, and Part IV discusses issues under international law.
Concluding remarks give our thoughts on what should be done.
I
THE THREAT: MAGNITUDE, DETECTION,
AND RESPONSES
A. Magnitude of the Comet and Asteroid Threat
Astronomers have cataloged more than 180 asteroids lo and
26 comets' in orbits that cross Earth's orbit. Only a small frac-
tion of near-Earth objects have been found so far; it is believed
that, very roughly, 2,000 such objects of at least one kilometer in
size exist.' 2 The largest, the asteroids (1627) Ivar and (1580) Be-
9 Timothy Ferris, Annals of Space: Is This the End?, NEw YORKER, Jan. 27,
1997, at 44, 49 (quoting Kevin Zahnle, NASA Ames Research Center, Moun-
tain View, Cal.).
10 David Rabinowitz et al., The Population of Earth-Crossing Asteroids, in
HAZARDS DUE TO COMETS AND ASTEROIDS, supra note 1, at 285.
11 Eugene M. Shoemaker et al., The Flux of Periodic Comets Near Earth, in
HAZARDS DUE TO COMETS AND ASTEROIDS, supra note 1, at 313.
.12 Thomas J. Ahrens & Alan W. Harris, Deflection and Fragmentation of
Near-Earth Asteroids, 360 NATURE 429 (1992). See generally Peter Ham-
merling & John L. Remo, NEO Interaction with Nuclear Radiation, 36 AcTA
ASTRONAUtICA 337 (1995).
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tulia, are of similar size to that which caused the mass extinction
65 million years ago.'3
None of the approximately 200 known objects are expected
to collide with Earth for at least two centuries, although one of
them (the asteroid 2340 Hathor) warrants special attention.1 4
Confident predictions cannot be made for the approximately
1,800 unknown-but-expected-near-Earth objects until they are
found and their orbits are calculated. As vil be discussed below,
even less is known about long-period comets that quickly ap-
proach the inner planets from beyond the solar system.
Overall, current estimates are that objects about ten meters
across strike the Earth almost annually with an explosive force of
about 10,000 tons of TNT (roughly the yield of the Hiroshima
bomb),' 5 but break up harmlessly (though noisily) in the atmos-
phere; objects about 100 meters across, such as the one that
burned Tunguska, arrive about once every 300 years and could
destroy a large city; one about four times the size of Tunguska's,
expected every few thousand years could, if it landed in an
ocean, cause tsunamis with waves over 60 meters high that would
wipe out coastal cities in all directions.16 Objects about one kilo-
meter across are estimated to hit approximately once in 500,000
years and can cause global catastrophic effects including the
death of billions of people. 17
13 Rabinowitz et al., supra note 10, at 288.
14 Donald K. Yeomans & Paul W. Chodas, Predicting Close Approaches of
Asteroids and Comets to Earth, in HAZARDS DUE TO CoMETs AND ASTEROIDS,
supra note 1, at 241,256; cf. E-mail from Tom Gehrels to Michael B. Gerrard
(Feb. 25, 1997) (on file with authors); The Threat of Large Earth-Orbit Crossing
Asteroids: Hearing Before the Subconmm. on Space of the Conlin. on Science,
Space, and Tednology, 103d Cong. 189, 190 (1993) [hereinafter Asteroid Threat
Hearing] (statement of Dr. Wesley T. Huntress, Jr., Associate Administrator
for the Office of Space Science, NASA Headquarters) ("NASA knows of no
asteroid or comet that is currently on a collision course with the Earth. As best
we can tell, no large object is likely to strike the Earth anytime in the next
several hundred years.").
15 See RICHARD RHODES, THE MAKING OF THE ATo.%IC BoMB 711 (1986)
(noting that the Hiroshima bomb had a yield of 12,500 tons of TNT).
16 J.G. Hills et al., Tsunani Generated by Small Asteroid Impacts, in
HAZARDS DUE TO COMETS AND ASTEROIDS, supra note 1, at 779.
17 See Thomas J. Ahrens & Alan W. Harris, Deflection and Fragnentation of
Near-Eard Asteroids, in HAZARDS, DUE TO COMErS AND ASTEROIDS, supra
note 1 at 897, 900; cf. David Morrison et al., The Impact Hazard, in HAZARDS
DUE TO COtMTS AND ASTEROIDS, supra note 1, at 59, 63 (noting most meteor-
oids-even ones as large as a few tens of meters in diameter-break up as they
enter Earth's atmosphere and never reach the ground); Hammerling & Remo,
supra note 12. See also Douglas 0. ReVelle, Historical Detection of Atmos-
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B. Detection Efforts
The location and tracking of near-Earth objects (NEOs), us-
ing a 36-inch telescope at Kitt Peak, has been one of the missions
of the Spacewatch program directed by Tom Gehrels of the Uni-
versity of Arizona. 18 A new 1.8-meter telescope was installed at
Kitt Peak in February 1997. Similar important work has long
been. conducted in the Palomar Mountain observatory in Califor-
nia, led by Eleanor Helin of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, while
newer efforts are beginning at Lowell Observatory in Arizona
and in Italy and France.19 In 1992, advisers to NASA proposed
expansion of this effort into what they called the Spaceguard Sur-
vey, with half a dozen 2.5-meter telescopes around the world, at a
cost of $50 million plus $10 million per year in operating costs.
In 25 years, this survey would be able to detect 90% of all the
Earth-crossing asteroids larger than a kilometer across. 20
A tracking program of the Anglo-Australian Observatory in
Siding Spring, Australia, the only program in the Southern Hemi-
sphere, was shut down because of lack of money.21 Such pro-
grams suffer because, relying primarily on decades-old
technology, they lack the scientific prestige that tends to attract
major funding. One leading NASA astronomer has said that the
number of people working on these efforts worldwide is "smaller
than the staff of one McDonald's restaurant. '22
pheric Impacts by Large Bolides Using Acoustic-Gravity Waves, Presentation
at the International Conference on Near-Earth Objects, Sandia National Labo-
ratory (Apr. 24-26, 1995) (examining global effects of large bolides (meteor-
fireballs) entering Earth's atmosphere, 1960 to the early 1980s); Owen B. Toon
et al., Environmental Perturbations Caused by Asteroid Impacts, in HAZARDS
DUE TO COMETS AND ASTEROIDS, supra note 1, at 791 (discussing the cata-
strophic environmental impacts caused by large asteroid impacts).
18 The 15-year-old Spacewatch program aims to generate statistics on all
comets and asteroids. The program locates some 33,000 such objects per year,
of which approximately 35 are Near-Earth Objects (NEOs). E-mail from Tom
Gehrels, supra note 14. See Mallon, supra note 3, at 16-19.
19 E-mail from Andrea Carusi to Michael B. Gerrard (Mar. 11, 1997) (on file
with the authors).
20 Peter "1yson, Comet Busters, TECH. REv., Feb. 1995, at 28; Spaceiwatch
Telescope <http://xlr8.lpl.arizona.edu/spacewatch/>.
21 See E-mail from Andrea Carusi, supra note 19 ("At this time there are
only two continuous programs .... Nobody is observing in the Southern Hemi-
sphere, something that causes the loss of all discovered objects which move into
the south.").
22 David Morrison, Target: tarthl, 23 ASTRONOMY 34 (Oct. 1995). See also
Leon Jaroff, A Shot Across the Earth's Bow, Last Week's Heavenly Near Miss
Has a Record. Are We Ready For the Next Incoming Asteroid?, T1ME, June 3,
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
8 [Volume 6
ASTEROIDS AND COMETS
Ground-based efforts attempt to locate new objects. Several
space missions are trying to learn more about some of the largest
asteroids that are already known. In 1991, NASA's Galileo, on
its way to Jupiter, surveyed the asteroid "951 Gaspra" from a
distance of 1,000 miles.P In February 1996, the first Near-Earth
Asteroid Rendezvous (NEAR) spacecraft was launched from
Cape Canaveral; in January 1999, it will approach "433 Eros," the
largest near-Earth asteroid, and orbit for nearly A year (and pos-
sibly land) and make observations about its physical and geologi-
cal properties.2 4 (Italian and French mathematicians have
calculated that there is a chance that in the next million years or
so, gravitational forces could nudge 433 Eros onto a collision
course with Earth.)25 Other missions are scheduled for launches
to various asteroids and comets in 1998, 1999, and 2003.26
C. Possible Countenneasures
If an NEO is found to be on a collision course with the
Earth, some people's first reaction would be to attempt to blow it
up with nuclear warheads. This could prove counterproductive,
however, if several of the resulting fragments are still on a course
to Earth and are large enough to penetrate its atmosphere; this
situation could increase rather than decrease the destruction
caused by impact with our planet.27 The composition of the ob-
ject is very important-nickel-iron asteroids will be far more dif-
ficult to break apart into multiple small pieces than chrondite
1996, at 61; David L. Chandler, Search for Earth-Bound Asteroids Looking Up,
BosToN GLOBE, May 13, 1996, at 27; Guy Webster, High-Tech System Aids
Search for 'Disasteroids'; Saving Civilizaton Can Be a Lonely Job, ARIz. RE.
PuBLic, Aug. 28, 1995, at Al. At least one astronomer has questioned the Mc-
Donald's comparison, and the general notion that only a handful of people are
working on the NEO effort, citing the equivalent of at least 20 full-time astron-
omers engaged in tracking NEOs worldwide. E-mail from Tom Gehrels, supra
note 14.
23 Asteroid Threat Hearing, supra note 14.
24 Scott L. Murchie et al., Encounter With Eros: The Near-Earth Asteroid
Rendezvous Mission, LUNAR & PLANETARY INFO. BuLL. (1995) (visited Dec.
23, 1996) <http://newproducts.jpl.nasa.gov/calandar/nearl.html>.
25 Malcolm NV. Browne, Mathematicians Say Asteroid May Hit Earth in a
Million Years, N.Y. Tanis, Apr. 25, 1996, at B10.
26 David, supra note 5; Andrew F. Cheng et al., Missions to Near-Earth Ob-
jects, in HAZARDS DuE To COMErS AND ASTEROIDS, supra note 1, at 651.
27 JOHN S. LEWIs, RAIN OF IRON AND IcE: THE VERY REAL THREAT OF
CoN=io AND ASTEROID BoNiBARDmENT 212-13 (1996); Clark R. Chapman et
al., Physical Properties of Near-Earth Asteroids: Implications for the Hazard
Issue, in HAZARDs DUE TO CorIETs AND ASTEROIDS, supra note 1, at 537, 547.
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asteroids or ice-and-dust comets. 28 Observation from a space-
craft located close to the object may be required to determine its
particular composition.
Most astronomers seem to feel that it is usually better to
deflect an object than to fragment it if there is enough warning
time. The idea is simply to move the asteroid or comet enough so
that it and the Earth will not be at the same place at the same
time. In the wqrds of John S. Lewis, co-director of the NASA/
University of Arizona Space Engineering Research Center,
we are not trying to banish the asteroid from the inner solar
system; we are merely trying to avoid a single predicted impact
with Earth. Suppose our asteroid-search team finds a 250-
meter body that is due to hit Earth dead center a few hundred
years from now.. This same body has probably been crossing
Earth's orbit for 10 million to 100 million years without an
impact. If we can just ease it by Earth without an impact on
this one occasion, we may well buy ourselves another 30 mil-
lion years to figure out what to do the next time it threatens
US.
2 9
To accomplish this diversion, nuclear devices seem to be the
only currently available technology that can deliver enough en-
ergy to move a large object far enough to avoid an Earth im-
pact.30 According to one analysis, the method that may transfer
the momentum from the blast to the object most effectively in-
volves burying the device below the surface of the asteroid.3'
Care must be taken not to inadvertently fragment the object.32
Many of the technologies that would be necessary for such a mis-
sion-data processing, telemetry, power supply, sensors, propul-
sion, etc., have been under development for military purposes by
28 V.A. Simonenko et al., Defending the Earth Against Impacts From Large
Comets and Asteroids, in HAZARDS DUE TO COMETS AND ASTEROIDS, supra
note 1, at 929, 950; Joseph G. Gurley, Vehicle Systems for Missions to Protect tie
Earth Against NEO Impacts, in HAZARDS DUE TO COMETS AND AsTERoIDs,
supra note 1, at 1035, 1049-51.
29 LEvis, supra note 27, at 213-14; cf. Gregory H. Canavan et al., Near.
Earth Object Interception Workshop, in HAZARDS DUE TO COMETS AND As.
TEROIDS, supra note 1, at 93, 94.
30 Ahrens & Harris, supra note 17, at 923; Hammerling & Remo, supra note
12.
31 Ahrens & Harris, supra note 17, at 917. A radically different mathemati-
cal analysis is presented in Pasquale M. Sforza & John L. Remo, Subsurface
Momentum Coupling Analysis for Near-Earth-Object Orbital Management, 35
ACrA ASTRONAUriCA 27 (1995).
32 Ahrens & Harris, supra note 17, at 913.
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the U.S. Department of Defense's Ballistic Missile Defense Or-
ganization, formerly known as the Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization (and popularly known as "Star Wars").33
For smaller NEOs, non-nuclear options may be available.
Among the speculative techniques that have been imagined are
pulsed lasers; kinetic energy deflection (i.e., simply striking the
asteroid with a massive projectile); mass drivers (devices that
would be installed on the surface of the asteroid, quarry the rock,
place it in buckets, and fling it into space-in the right direction
over a period of years); very large solar sails that would be af-
fixed to the asteroid and capture solar radiation to exert pres-
sure; and solar collectors that would capture sunlight on a curved
primary mirror, focus it onto the surface of the asteroid causing
the surface layers to vaporize, and thereby generating thrust.:
All of the deflection options require abundant advance
warning; an asteroid, unlike a sports car, cannot be turned on a
dime. Fortunately, Earth-crossing asteroids that are large
enough to pose a global threat are likely.to be discovered de-
cades, if not centuries or millennia, in advance of collision.
Therefore, there would likely be ample time to decide on a strat-
egy, develop the technology, launch a vanguard mission to learn
more about the object's properties, launch the interception mis-
sion to execute the chosen strategy, and allow the deflection to
take its course.3 5
A qualitatively different problem is posed by long-period
comets, which are defined as comets with almost parabolic orbits
and periods of revolution around the Sun exceeding 200 years;
some have orbital periods of millions of years3 6 Thus, any long-
period comet that comes into view is likely being seen by human-
ity for the first time. They move much faster than asteroids and
33 S. Nozette et al., DOD Technologies and Missions of Relevance to Aster-
oid and Comet Exploration, in HAZARDS DUE TO CoMErs AND ASTEROIDS,
supra note 1, at 671.
34 HJ. Melosh et al., Non-Nuclear Strategies for Deflecting Comets and As-
teroids, in HAzARDS DUE TO COMETS AND ASTEROIDS, supra note 1, at 1111.
See also David K. Hill, Gathering Airs Schemes for Averting Asteroid Doom,
268 SCIENCE 1562 (1995).
35 Gurley, supra note 28, at 1038, 1041; LEwvis, supra note 27, at 211. But see
B.G. Marsden & D.I. Steel, Warning Tunes and Impact Probabilities for Long-
Period Comets, in HAZADS DUE TO COMETS AND ASTEROIDS, supra note 1, at
241, 221 (arguing that some small but threatening objects, mostly resulting from
the breakup of comets, may give only a few hours warning).
36 HAZARDs DUE TO COMETS AND ASTEROIDS, supra note 1, at 1255.
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their trajectories are difficult to precisely predict because their
paths are influenced not only by gravity, but also by the solar
forces that generate their tails, thus creating uncertainty about
whether they will hit Earth. They are likely to be spotted 250 to
500 days before impact, although some sightings can occur later.
On January 30, 1996, Yuji Hyakutake spotted a comet with a nu-
cleus of one to two miles just two months before its closest ap-
proach to Earth (about 9.5 million miles away).37 Comets that
cannot be seen by optical telescopes because they come from the
direction of the sun and are hidden by the glare may be found
only a few days or hours in advance. These comets leave no time
for deflection and very little time for deliberation and prepara-
tion; the only hope of defense would be to have nuclear-armed
spacecraft ready for launch or in standby orbits.38 In the under-
stated words of one NASA official, "[f]or the worst case, a large
object discovered to be on a collision course with Earth in a mat-
ter of days, there is at present no response that has a high
probability of success." 39
The good news is that long-period comets represent only a
tiny fraction of the Objects that may strike the Earth, so the odds
that one will crash here in the next several centuries are exceed-
ingly remote.40
II
THE RISKS IN CONTEXT
A. Quantifying Relative Risks
One astronomer has calculated (in very round numbers, of
course) that four times within every million years a large NEO
will arrive that kills one billion people. 41 Other estimates are
very similar.42 The death of four billion people over one million
37 Reflections on the "Comet of the Decade," ASTRONOMy, July 1996, at 111;
Comet-Crash Warnings: Too Little, Too Late?, SKY & TELESCOPE, Feb. 1997, at
13.
38 Marsden & Steel, supra note 35, at 221; Yeomans & Chodas, supra note
14, at 257.
39 Asteroid Threat Hearing, supra note 14, at 29 (statement of John D.G.
Rather, Assistant Director for Space Technology (Program Development) for
the Office of Advanced Concepts & Technology, NASA Headquarters).
40 LEwis, supra note 27, at 220-21.
41 Id. at 209.
42 See generally Chapman & Morrison, supra note 7. See also, Ahrens &
Harris, supra note 17, 'at 900.
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years works out to an average of 4,000 people per year. If there
are four billion people on the planet, an average death rate of
4,000 people per year means that each year, every person statisti-
cally has a one in one million chance of being killed by a comet
.or asteroid. Of course, in actuality the results would be very
lumpy, and not spread out like the averages suggest, but the
averages do allow comparisons to more familiar risks.
An annual death rate of 4,000 people is very similar to the
rate of annual drowning deaths in the United States (4,500 in
1995) or fires (4,100), and more than those who die from choking
on food or objects (2,800) or from accidental discharge of fire-
arms (1,400).43 'In an average year, about 700 people worldwide
die in the crashes of commercial airlines.44 All of these are
causes of death that our society goes to great expense to try to
prevent.
An individual's statistical risk of death also receives consid-
erable regulatory attention. For example, the U.S. Environmen-
tal Protection Agency's regulations under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA) 45 declare that a one in one million chance of con-
tracting cancer is the threshold for considering the cleanup of
sites contaminated with hazardous substances. 46 That is a life-
time risk that any person will contract a case of cancer, whether
exposure to the chemicals is actual or hypothetical, without re-
spect to the number of people actually exposed, and without re-
spect- to whether the cancers are fatal.47 Thus, on a purely
statistical basis, CERCLA addresses risks that are significantly
lower than those posed by comets and asteroids. CERCLA risks
are addressed by remedial programs that cost on average $30
million per site.48 Thus the cost of cleaning up two to four aver-
age Superfund sites (there are a total of about 1,200 nationwide)
43 WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FAcrS 1997, at 967 (Robert Famighetti
ed., 1996).
44 Id. at 968.
45 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1995).
46 40 C.F.R. §'300.430(e)(2)(A)(2) (1995).
47 Katherine D. Walker et al., Confronting Superfiad Mythology: The Case
of Risk Assessment and Management, in ANALYZING SUPERFUND: ECONOMICS,
SCiENCE, AND LAW 25, 26-27 (Richard L. Revesz & Richard B. Stewart eds.,
1995).
48 THO AS W. CHURCH & ROBERT T. NKxhiuRA, CLEANING Up THE
MEss: IMPLEMNINTATnON STRATEGIES IN SUP-RFUND 8 (1993).
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is roughly the equivalent of carrying out NASA's recommenda-
tions for the worldwide Spaceguard program.
Of course, the temporal dimension must be central to any
comparisons, and here too, CERCLA is instructive. Only a small
fraction of the risks addressed in CERCLA pertain to current
exposure of people to chemicals; most of these risks are for fu-
ture hypothetical consumers of drinking water that is not now
used for human consumption.4 9 Thus CERCLA too is aimed pri-
marily at future generations, though not nearly so far into the
future as those most likely to be the victims of comets and
asteroids.
Protection of generations in the far distant future is the fo-
cus of another group of environmental programs-those aimed
at the disposal of radioactive waste. The U.S. government plans
to build a repository for high-level radioactive waste (primarily
spent fuel rods from nuclear power plants and certain wastes
from nuclear weapons production) under Yucca Mountain, Ne-
vada. The facility is being designed to protect people 10,000
years into the future. Its planning has required geologists to
stretch the outer limits of their predictive capabilities. Another
facility-the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)-has already
been built, but not yet opened, in a deep salt deposit near Carls-
bad, New Mexico, for the disposal of plutonium and other trans-
uranic wastes.50
This begins to approach the time scale involved in guarding
against comets and asteroids. It may be off by an order of magni-
tude, but these are time scales that the human mind is not
equipped to grasp.
Radioactive waste and comet/asteroid threats pose a threat
to the present and also a (perhaps much greater) threat to the
future. There is a key difference, however. What we do today in
the realm of generating and managing radioactive waste will have
great impact on the effect that waste will have on future genera-
'tions. In contrast, what we do today about comets and asteroids
will have no effect at all on the likelihood of a future collision,
though today's observations could give our descendants a slightly
49 Walker et al., supra note 47, at 25; James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi,
The Magnitude and Policy Implications of Health Risks from Hazardous Waste
Sites, in ANALYZING SUPERFUND, supra note 47, at 66.
50 See generally JAMEs FLYNN ET AL., ONE HUNDRED CENTURIES OrF SOLI-
TUDE: REDIRECTING AMERICA'S HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY
(1995).
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greater head start. Thus, today's generation bears a far greater
moral obligation to distantly future generations with respect to
radioactive waste than with respect to asteroids and comets.
B. The Psychology of Response
If 4,000 lives each year are truly at stake due to NEOs, one
would ordinarily expect very large public expenditures to follow.
The figures vary widely depending on the program involved, but
a rule of thumb in assessing the costs and benefits of life-saving
programs is that one life is worth $4-$8 million.51 At that rate,
comet and asteroid detection would warrant $16-$32 billion per
year. That exceeds what the astronomical establishment is seek-
ing by a factor of more than one thousand.
One possible explanation for the discrepancy is the uncer-
tainties involved. The estimates of likely deaths from extrater-
restrial impacts depend on numerous assumptions based on
necessarily sparse data. It is not clear, however, that CERCLA
risk assessments, for example, are any less heroic in their strings
of assumptions.52 Another explanation for our unwillingness to
spend heavily on comet and asteroid protection may be that we
greatly discount the value of lives in remotely distant genera-
tions-those that will come millennia after our great-grandchil-
dren's tombstones have been eroded into dust. Some regulatory
agencies 53 and at least one court54 have formally embraced the
idea of discounting future lives in making present day spending
decisions.
Nonetheless, preservation of the planet for future genera-
tions is a common theme in environmental law. It underlies nu-
merous statutes, such as the Endangered Species Act,55 the
51 CARL F. CRANOR, REGULATING Toxic SUBSTANCES: A PHILOSOPHy Or
ScIENcE AND THE LAv 125 (1993), and sources cited therein. Wide variations
in what is actually spent to save lives through various means are discussed in
Tammy 0. Tens et al., Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their Cost-
Effectiveness, 15 RIsK ANALYsiS 369 (1995).
52 See generally Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regu-
lation, 95 CoLum. L. REv. 1613 (1995). See also Howard Latin, Good Science,
Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. oN REG. 89 (198s).
53 See generally Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemrnmersbaugh, The Shadow of
the Future: Discount Rates, Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAN.
L. REv. 267 (1993).
54 Corrosion Proof Fittings v. Environmental Protection Agency, 947 F.2d
1201, 1218 (5th Cir. 1991).
55 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1994).
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Wilderness Act,56 the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act,57 and the Na-
tional Historic Preservation Act.58 It has deep psychological,
religious, and philosophical origins.59 The U.S. Constitution was
adopted to represent a fundamental value by "secur[ing] the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity. '60 One exten-
sive poll found that people from every walk of life cite concern
for future generations as a. central reason to protect the
environment. 61
Just how far into the future this concern will extend is hard
to say. The close attention paid to what will become of Yucca
Mountain and WIPP in 10,000 years suggests that people do care
about what happens beyond the horizon of fathomable time,
even if the worst that could plausibly occur there is a local disas-
ter-not something that could threaten the survival of the spe-
cies. The sheer incomprehensibility of the time scales involved in
both issues suggests that the great difference in public concern
over radioactive waste versus asteroids is not a matter of quanti-
fied years. Rather, it may be partly due to the fact that since
1945 mankind has known for certain that nuclear material can
cause mass death, whereas asteroids appear more hypothetical.
It also may be attributable to the fact that radioactive waste im-
plies evil (or at least negligent) human action, and therefore in-
cites abhorrence in a way that a purely natural force does not.62
The reasons for the discrepancy between the statistical risk
of death by comet and asteroid, and the amount of resources and
attention devoted to the issue, are illuminated by studies in cog-
nitive psychology. Some of these studies were performed in the
context of individual decisions of whether to buy flood insurance.
In this and similar contexts, willingness to spend money to guard
against a low probability, high consequence risk correlated very
poorly with what formal decision theory would suggest. Instead,
people have been found to be heavily influenced by whether they
know of similar disasters affecting others, especially people they
56 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (1994).
57 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1994).
58 16 U.S.C. § 461 (1994).
59 See generally JOHN PASSMORE, MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATUiR:
ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AND WESTERN TRADITIONS (1974).
60 U.S. CONST. preamble.
61 WILLETr KEMPTON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES IN AMERICAN
CULTURE 95-102 (1995).
62 See generally Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk and the Future of Nuclear
Power, 9 Amiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 191 (1992).
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know. Where the risk seems purely theoretical, there is little im-
pulse to respond.63 For a risk that seems never to have killed
anyone so far, it is no surprise that few people take seriously the
idea of taking precautions.
Before deep public concern can arise, the asteroid and
comet threat must also overcome the "giggle factor" that now
afflicts it.64 Then-Vice President Dan Quayle received a good
deal of ribbing for mentioning the issue in a speech in 1990.65
This threat has been the stuff of Hollywood (at least six movies
between 1951 and 1984, plus two more about to begin produc-
tion), television (a 1997 NBC miniseries, Asteroid, a rash of
documentaries in 1997, and episodes in the old Superman and
Star Trek series),66 and several science fiction novels (including
Arthur C. Clarke's 1973 Rendezvous with Rama, Larry Niven
and Jerry Pournelle's 1977 Lucifer's Hammer, and Pat Robert-
son's 1995 The End of the Age). In spite of this (or perhaps be-
cause of it), the general public does not take the danger
seriously, even considering its statistical similarity to several com-
mon worries, because the similarity is purely statistical. In every
meaningful way, the asteroid threat is wholly different from any-
thing in human experience. Real crises (wars, depressions, ex-
plosions) spark major new laws, and there has never been an
asteroid crisis, in the sense of a known imminent threat.67
63 Colin F. Camerer & Howard Kunreuther, Decision Processes for Low
Probability Events: Policy Implications, 8 J. Por,'y ANALYSIS & MGrr. 565
(1989); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Con-
tract, 47 STAN,. L. REv. 211, 223-24 (1995); Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier,
Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL
STUD. 747,769-72 (1990); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice
and the Framing of Decisions, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONrRAST BE-
TWEE:N ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 67 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W.
Reder eds., 1987).
64 See Mallon, supra note 3, at 18.
65 Mike Royko, Astronomical Task Perfect for Quayle, CHI. TRIB., June 6,
1990, at C3.
66 Rick Schindler, Comet Relief, TV GUIDE, Feb. 15, 1997, at 22; Stand By
For Comet's Media Aftershocks, 275 ScIEnCE 761 (1997).
67 However, the notion of NEO threats may be moving into the mainstream,
as evidenced by TWA's statement in response to lawsuits filed against it that
the crash of Flight 800 might have been caused by a meteor. See Gail Ap-
pleson, TWA Seeks Dismissal of Flight 800 Suits, REuTERs WORLD SERv., Jan.
15, 1997.
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C. - The Risks of Counter-Measures
Perhaps the biggest threat that asteroids pose to mankind
today is the excuse they provide for continuing to deploy nuclear
weapons. In 1996 there were two stark examples of this. In
April, China refused to sign a treaty with Russia banning nuclear
weapons testing, on the stated grounds that such weapons might
be needed to combat the asteroid threatfis In September, a
"Space Protection of Earth" conference was held at the Russian
Federal Nuclear Center in Snezhinsk, and the sole American sci-
entist to attend reported that the Russians are considering build-
ing a system of nuclear-armed missiles that could be readied for
launch in ninety midutes if an incoming asteroid were spotted.69
It seems obvious that the deployment of a nuclear weapons sys-
tem in China, Russia, or anywhere else poses a threat of acciden-
tal or malevolent mass destruction that dwarfs the odds that such
a system will be suddenly needed to beat back a long-period
comet or another atypical threat that arises with too little warn-
ing for us to develop a defensive system from scratch.
Some U.S. scientists today advocate a testing program for
nuclear explosions at remote asteroids to determine the parame-
ters under which defensive measures would work best. The most
visible proponent of this approach is the eighty-nine year old Dr.
Edward Teller, who is better known as the "father" of the hydro-
gen bomb.70 Representatives of the Ballistic Missile Defense Or-
ganization have also recently advocated an accelerated program
of testing (not necessarily with nuclear warheads) utilizing some
of the several hundred Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) that must be destroyed by 2002 in accordance with the
START II treaty.71 One physicist who has studied the issue,
68 Patrick E. Tyler, Chinese Seek Atom Option to Fend Off Asteroids, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 1996, at 4.
69 David Morrison, Space Protection of the Earth (SPE-96) Conference (vis-
ited Oct. 10, 1996) <http://ccf.arc.nasa.gov/sstlO-1O-96.html>.
70 See David Morrison & Edward Teller, The Impact Hazard: Issues for the
Future, in HAZARDS DUE TO COMETS AND ASTEROIDS, supra note 1, at 1135.
As a historical footnote, it might be pointed out that one of Teller's colleagues
in the development of the atomic bomb, Luis W. Alvarez, who won the Nobel
Prize for his work with subatomic particles, discovered (alongside his geologist
son Walter Alvarez) compelling evidence that an asteroid caused the extinction
of the dinosaurs. See Alvarez, supra note 3.
71 David Morrison, Brief Report, PLANETARY DEFENSE WORKSHOP, (vis-
ited May 22-26, 1995) <http://ccf.arc.nasa.gov/sst/news_Ol.html>.
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while not explicitly advocating the testing of nuclear devices, has
written:
Clearly, the NEO hazard threat cannot be used as a pretext
for rearmament and appropriate safeguards must be taken to
minimize the threat of misuse. If mitigation methods and de-
vices are to be developed, safeguards and rigorous controls
against their misuse must play a dominant role at every state
of design, development, testing, and deployment. However, in
the absence of specifically developed mitigation technology it
would be prudent to have available that technology and hard-
ware which can most effectively deal with an Earth threaten-
ing NEO. We must and can establish the appropriate
custodial mechanisms that allow us to maintain those options
which can best protect the Earth.72
The development, fabrication, and launch of a device to
carry out the experiments proposed by Dr. Teller and others
seems to be fraught with risk. A release of dangerous quantities
of radioactive material (whether or not through detonation)
could occur through manufacturing error, launch failure, terrorist
action, or other plausible scenarios. The probability of a radioac-
tive release with locally adverse effects, or even of a catastrophic
detonation, seems to exceed the chances of a long-period comet
sneaking up on us. The risk/benefit calculation would have to
consider the scale of destruction to be caused by a nuclear acci-
dent versus the destruction that might be averted by an experi-
ment in comet hazard mitigation. Both items are probably
beyond useful quantification, but it is doubtful that this factor
would close the gap between the risks of conducting the experi-
ment now versus the risks of waiting until an actual threat ap-
peared. Experience confirms the fear of accidents in the
handling of nuclear weapons.73
The danger that a purportedly defensive system could mal-
function or be intentionally aimed at an Earth-based target
seems obvious. A less obvious danger was pointed out by the
late Carl Sagan who argued that development of asteroid-deflec-
tion technology "is a double-edged sword. If we can perturb an
asteroid out of impact trajectory, it follows that we can also
72 John L. Remo, Policy Perspectives from the UN International Conference
on Near-Earth Objects, SPAcE Poi'y 13, 15 (1996).
73 See infra part H.
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transform one on a benign trajectory into an Earth-impactor. ''74
For that reason, "through negligence, fanaticism, or madness, the
technology to deflect asteroids and comets might be used to gen-
erate a global catastrophe on a time scale much shorter than the
waiting time for the natural catastrophe that this technology is
designed to circumvent. '75
The authors wrote to Dr. Teller to ask his views concerning
the balancing of the benefits and the risks of creating a planetary
defense system in advance of the discovery of an actual threat.
He replied that:
mutual benefits and confidence due to international coopera-
tion concerning a common danger far outweighs in importance
the danger of misuse. Indeed, successful international cooper-
ation on any subject is apt to decrease the motivation for con-
flict. To my mind, this is the main problem that we have to
solve. 76
The advantages of international cooperation cannot be de-
nied. However, in the absence of a known threat, we believe that
the deployment of a defensive system (as opposed to a detection
system) poses far greater dangers to mankind, through accident
or criminal act, than the asteroid/comet threat itself.
III
DoMEsTic LEGAL ISSUES
Having discussed the nature and magnitude of the risks
posed by comets and asteroids, as well as the programs to detect
and defend against them, we turn to the legal implications of
these programs.
A. Congressional Interest
Congress has exhibited some interest in near-Earth asteroid
detection. In conjunction with the passage of the 1990 NASA
Multiyear Authorization Act,77 the Committee on Science,
Space, and Technology of the House of Representatives directed
74 Carl Sagan & Steven J. Ostro, Dangers of Asteroid Deflection, 368 NA.
TURE 501 (1994).
75 Allan W. Harris et al., The Deflection Dilemma: Use Versus Misuse of
Technologies for Avoiding Interplanetary Collision Hazards, in HAZARDS DLip
TO COMETS AND ASTEROIDS, supra note 1, at 1145, 1146.
76 Letter from Dr. Edward Teller to Michael B. Gerrard (Jan. 30, 1997) (on
file with authors).
77 42 U.S.C. §§ 2465, 2471a (1990).
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NASA to design a comprehensive program for the detection of
asteroids crossing the Earth's orbit and to define systems for de-
stroying or altering the paths of asteroids headed for the Earth.78
The Committee provided the following rationale for its
recommendation:
The Committee believes that it is imperative that the detection
rate of Earth-orbit-crossing asteroids must be increased sub-
stantially, and that the means to destroy or to alter the orbits
of asteroids when they threaten collision should be defined
and agreed upon internationally.
The chances of the Earth being struck by a large asteroid
are extremely small, but since the consequences of such a colli-
sion are extremely large, the Committee believes it is only pru-
dent to assess the nature of the threat and prepare to deal with
it. We have the technology to detect such asteroids and to pre-
vent their collision with the Earth.7 9
The results of the Congressional directive were presented at
a 1993 meeting of the Committee by NASA officials, who recom-
mended continued funding for both detection of NEOs and the
design of a comprehensive response system.o In 1994, the
House Committee on Science and Technology again indicated its
support of NEO detection by directing NASA, in conjunction
with the Department of Defense and the space agencies of other
countries, to identify and catalogue -within ten years the orbital
characteristics of all asteroids and comets greater than one kilo-
meter in diameter whose orbits cross that of the Earth.8'
The Republican ascendance to control of the House in 1994
changed the composition of the Committee on Science, Space,
and Technology. It is unclear whether the current Committee
leadership shares the concern with NEO detection. Plagued with
other budgetary problems since 1994, NASA has not pressed
Congress for funding for Spaceguard or for other NEO detection
programs.8 Federal agency attention, however, has continued:
from 1992 to 1996, the Department of Energy, NASA, and the
78 H.R. REP. No. 101-763, at 30 (1990).
79 Id.
80 Asteroid Threat Hearing, supra note 14, at 28 (statement of John D.G.
Rather); it at 189 (statement of Dr. Wesley T. Huntress, Jr.).
81 HOUSE CO1MM. ON SCIENCE, SPACE & TECHNOLOOY H.R. REP. No. 103-
19 (1994). Available on the Internet, <http:llccf.arc.nasa.govlsst/
c_statements.html>.
82 Mallon, supra note 3, at 18.
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U.S. Air Force Space Command held a series of gatherings to
identify impact hazards and discuss potential defenses.8 3
B. Environmental Review: NEPA
Any U.S. sponsored NEO program must comply with the
requirements of U.S. environmental laws, principally the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).84 Each of the poten-
tial NEO program activities-land-based detection, space-based
detection, interception, destruction, and deflection-may have
environmental impacts that must be considered. The remote ar-
eas and high elevations that are most favorable for telescope con-
struction are often ecologically fragile or unique areas. Rocket
launches are associated with local environmental impacts at the
launch site, and rocket fuel has been linked to ozone depletion.8 5
The use of nuclear or other technology to destroy or deflect
NEOs will potentially have environmental impacts on Earth;
raising the additional issue of whether the effects of such activi-
ties, if solely confined to outer space, would be subject to regula-
tion under U.S. law.
NEPA provides that every federal agency has "the obliga-
tion to consider every significant aspect of the envirofimental im-
pact of a proposed action [and to] inform the public that it ha[d]
indeed considered environmental concerns in its decision-making
process. '8 6 As discussed below, the nature of the analysis re-
quired under NEPA will depend on the activities contemplated
by the NEO project and how the project is defined.
In order to document its consideration of environmental im-
pacts, each federal agency must prepare an Environmental Im-
pact Statement (EIS) for "every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment. 87 Agen-
cies may conduct a preliminary analysis, in the form of an
83 Hill, supra note 34, at 1562.
84 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1996).
85 Lenny Siegel, Muck" No Free Launch, 15 MOTHER JON's 6, Sept./Oct.
1990, at 24; William J. Broad, New Methods Sought to Dispose of Rockets With
No Hann to Earth, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1991,'at C4. See also David
Swinbanks, Japan Fishes for More Space Launches, 385 NATURE 287 (1997)
(reporting that Japanese space agency pays fishermen in vicinity of its space
launch centers, due to concerns over damage to fishing grounds).
86 Baltimore Gas & Elec. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S.
87, 97 (1983) (internal citations omitted).
87 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1996).
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Environmental Assessment, and may at that point conclude that
the proposed project will not have a significant environmental
impact. Issuance of such a Finding of No Significant Impact
(FONSI) enables an agency to proceed with the action without
preparing an EIS (though this FONSI is subject to a challenge in
court).88
A NASA-sponsored program for NEO detection and study
that employs currently existing detection equipment and technol-
ogy is unlikely to require the preparation of a full EIS. Accord-
ing to the NASA "guidelines implementing NEPA, the only
actions that categorically require the preparation of an EIS are
the development and operation of new space vehicles or new
launch vehicles.8 9 There are many other actions that fall into a
-grey area. The rules would not automatically require an EIS, and
the application of criteria to determine whether the "federal ac-
tion" contemplated is "major" or whether it might involve "sig-
nificant impact" on the environment is subjective. Current
NASA efforts related to NEOs, including the upgrade of existing
telescopes at the University of Arizona and the Arecibo Obser-
vatory in Puerto Rico,90 do not require an EIS under the regula-
tions. In addition, in 1996, NASA issued a FONSI with respect
to its near-Earth asteroid rendezvous (NEAR) mission, sched-
uled to reach the asteroid 433 Eros in 1999, stating that "ex-
pected impacts to the human environment associated with the
mission arise almost entirely from the normal launch of the Delta
II 7925." 91
Even a simple detection program might require an EIS if it
involved the construction of new telescopes on new sites9 - or a
substantial increase in the number of space launches. As is illus-
trated by the series of challenges to the siting of a telescope pro-
ject in Arizona,93 the sites that are ideal for telescopes-isolated,
elevated locales-are often protected areas that have unique bio-
88 For a general discussion of National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
review, see Valerie M. Fogleman, CIL 1: Environmental Impact Statements, in
ENviORrm.NTAL LAW PRACrICE GUME (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1992).
89 14 C.F.R § 1216.305(c) (1988).
9) Asteroid Threat Hearing, supra note 14, at 189 (statement of Dr. Wesley
T. Huntress, Jr.).
91 Eros FONSI, 61 Fed. Reg. 1950, 1951 (1996).
92 It will be possible to complete the NEO survey without constructing new
telescopes, according to one astronomer. E-mail from Tom Gehrels, supra note
14.
93 See Mount Graham Coalition v. Thomas, 89 F.3d 554 (9th Cir. 1996).
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logical values. That series of cases pitted the defenders of the
endangered red squirrel, an inhabitant of Mount Graham and its
surroundings in the Coronado National Forest in southeastern
Arizona, against an international consortium seeking to construct
several telescopes on various peaks of Mount Graham. Aided by
Congressional intervention, the telescopes were eventually sited
in areas found less vital to the squirrels' survival.
Space launches are also associated with significant if local
environmental effects, including noise pollution and the release
of pollutants such as carbon monoxide, hydrochloric acid, and
aluminum oxide.94 The potential environmental effects are not
confined to the local launch site; the burning of rocket fuel has
been labelled a potential cause of stratospheric ozone pollu-
tion.95 The risk of accidental release of toxic substances-possi-
bly including radioactive materials-has also been considered in
evaluating space launches under NEPA. In two cases titled Flor-
ida Coalition for Peace and Justice v. Bush ,96 the plaintiffs chal-
lenged NASA's decision to go forward with two space
exploration projects: '(1) the "Galileo Mission," which involved
the launch of the space shuttle Atlantis to study Jupiter, and (2)
the "Ulysses Project," the launch of a space probe to study the
sun. In both cases, the plaintiffs' claims were brought on the
ground that the EIS did not adequately assess the projects' risks.
One of the risks considered was the possibility of an accident
causing the release of plutonidim dioxide (present as part of the
probes' energy supply), which poses a risk to humans if ingested
or inhaled. In both cases, the court concluded that NASA had
adequately assessed the risks of the projects and denied a tempo-
rary restraining order to the plaintiffs.
Any launches in connection with asteroid/comet defense will
be dwarfed in number (and hence in environmental impact) by
launches for commercial purposes. Given the greatly expanding
use of satellites for telecommunications, it has been estimated
that 1,700 commercial satellites will be launched in the next dec-
94 Eros FONSI, 61 Fed. Reg. 1950, 1951 (1996).
95 See generally Lynn Anne Shapiro, Note, The Need for International
Agreements Concerning the Ozone Depleting Effects of Chemical Rocket Pro.
pulsion, 4 S. CAL. IrI'E-Drisc. L.J. 739 (1995).
96 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13345 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 5, 1990); 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12003 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 10, 1989).
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ade (compared to the 150 now in orbit).97 Equipping space
probes with nuclear warheads or nuclear propulsion systems,
however, may pose much greater risks, since in recent years ap-
proximately one in ten unmanned satellite launches have failed. 9s
Even the worst case environmental effects of a detection sys-
tem are relatively minor when compared to the environmental
effects associated with a planetary defense program. A planetary
defense program would likely involve, in addition to space
launches, the detonation of nuclear weapons or the use or testing
of other high-powered devices in outer space. These activities
raise familiar concerns about nuclear weapons and, additionally,
may trigger questions about the impacts of explosions in space on
the human environment.
Many of the potential impacts of a planetary defense pro-
gram would occur outside the United States-in fact, off the
planet-raising in the extreiiae the question of NEPA's extrater-
ritorial reach, an issue that has been the subject of extensive de-
bate. In general, there is a presumption against the
extraterritorial reach of federal statutes.99 Neither Congress nor
the courts have ultimately decided whether NEPA's require-
ments apply extraterritorially in all cases; courts that have ad-
dressed the issue have produced varied results. 00 In the case
97 Eric Schine & Peter Elstrom, The Satellite Biz Blasts Off, Bus. Wg., Jan.
27, 1997, at 62, 63.
98 Andy Reinhardt, What Goes Up... Has to Get There First, Bus. Wr.,
Jan. 27, 1997, at 70. For a discussion of nuclear propulsion systems for this
application, see Pasquale M. Sforza & John L. Remo, Propulsion Options for
Missions to Near Earth Objects, ACrA ASTRONAurTiCA (forthcoming 1997).
99 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345,1366 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1230 (1991); Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
100 See, e.g., Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Haw. 1973) (holding
that NEPA applies to Pacific Island Trust Territories, where federal law does
not generally apply); Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (as-
suming, without deciding, that NEPA applies to federally funded construction
activities in Panama); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regula-
tory Comm'n, 647 F.2d at 1366 (holding that NEPA does not apply extraterrito-
rially with respect to nuclear export decisions); Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748
F. Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990) (holding that, based on foreign policy concerns and
the application of Executive Order 12114 ("Environmental Effects Abroad of
Major Federal Actions"), NEPA did not apply to the transport of chemical
munitions abroad). For a general discussion of NEPAs extraterritorial applica-
tion, see The Forum. Should NEPA Apply Abroad?, 8 ENVTL FORUM, NovJ
Dec. 1991, at 24; DAmL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LA-,v AND LTGATION § 5.04
(1996).
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that is probably closest to the asteroid situation, Environmental
Defense Fund v. Massey,101 the D.C. Circuit found NEPA appli-
cable to the National Science Foundation's incineration of food
waste in Antarctica. NEPA was designed to ensure that federal
agencies make decisions after full consideration of the environ-
mental effects; the court held that the regulated conduct is the
decision itself, rather than the execution. The Massey decision
also hinged in part on the fact that the United States exercised a
"real measure of legislative control over the region at issue" 102
and that Antarctica was not a sovereign nation with laws that
might conflict with those of the United States.
The notion that NEPA regulates not the execution of a deci-
sion, but the federal decision-making process itself, which pre-
sumably occurs within the United States, might suggest that it
should always apply extraterritorially. While the court restricted
its decision to the particular facts of the case-notably, that the
challenged activity took place in Antarctica-either of the Mas-
sey .rationales suggests that a U.S. sponsored planetary defense
program would be subject to NEPA. However, no court has had
to confront the question of whether the "environment" protected
by NEPA includes outer space. The notion of the environment
encompasses our environs and our surroundings, and the idea of
proximity and of potential impact (however indirect) upon our-
selves is implicit. Though NEPA was enacted the same year that
man first walked on the moon, it does not appear that NEPA's
framers considered whether the new law would apply to activities
in space. 0 3
101 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
102 Id. at 534.
103 The only mention of outer space in NEPA's legislative history comes in a
report by the person who is widely credited as the intellectual father of NEPA,
Professor Lynton K. Caldwell of Indiana University. This report, which
NEPA's sponsor, Senator Henry Jackson, inserted into the record, states:
The United States, as the greatest user of natural resources and manipula-
tor of nature in all history, has a large and obvious stake in the protection
and wise management of man-environment relationships everywhere. Its
international interests in the oceanic, polar, and outer space environments
are clear. Effective international, environmental control would, under
most foreseeable contingencies, be in the interest of the United States,
and could hardly be prejudicial to the legitimate interests of any nation.
American interests and American leadership would, however, be greatly
strengthened if the Nation's commitment to a sound environmental policy
at home were clear.
115 CONG. REc. 29066, 29072 (1969) (emphasis added).
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A planetary defense program-a concerted plan for detec-
tion and for the design and testing of a NEO response system-
might trigger the preparation of a "programmatic EIS" for the
development of new technology. Agencies may not avoid draft-
ing an impact statement simply because doing so requires "some
degree of forecasting." 104 If, hypothetically, the Department of
Defense and NASA together devised three possible strategies for
responding to the NEO impact hazard and decided to develop
and test the three technologies simultaneously, without deciding
which would be implemented, an EIS might still be required to
consider the environmental effects of the potential technologies.
If an NEO deflection program employed already existing tech-
nologies, the technology development (as opposed to its use)
might not require the preparation of an EIS.105
A programmatic EIS requirement can also arise where a
group of disparate activities that share the same goal may have a
significant environmental impact, even if none of the individual
component activities would require an EIS. The Council on En-
vironmental Quality (CEQ) guidelines implementing NEPA de-
fine a "major federal action" requiring an EIS as one likely to
have environmental effects that include the "[a]doption of pro-
grams, such as a group of concerted actions to implement a spe-
cific policy .... ,,106 Where proposed actions are "related to each
other closely enough to be... a single course of action"'0 7 then a
programmatic EIS will be required, if cumulatively the activities
have a significant environmental impact.103
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) has been the subject of
several programmatic EISs and numerous Environmental As-
sessments related to particular aspects of the program. The No-
104 Scientists Inst. for Pub. Info. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079,
1089 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) required for development of liquid metal fast breeder reactor).
105 Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(holding Navy not required to look in detail at environmental impacts at all 89
sites under consideration for siting Trident missiles; distinguishing from SIPI on
grounds that "Trident Program does not involve the implementation of any
brand new technology with the possibility of unforeseen or unknown
consequences").
106 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b)(3) (1997).
107 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(a) (1997).
108 See; e.g., Foundation on Econ. Trends v. Lyng, 817 F.2d 882 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (programmatic EIS not required for Department of Agriculture's animal
productivity research on grounds that activities are too diverse and discrete).
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tice of Intent to prepare the "umbrella" EIS for the Ballistic
Missile Defense System stated that the EIS would examine the
potential environmental consequences associated with the life-
cycle activities for the proposed action, including "development,
testing, production, basing and siting, operations and mainte-
nance support, and eventual decommissioning activities."' 109
Although this was the "umbrella" EIS, it did not propose to con-
sider the effects of actually employing any of the weapons sys-
tems alternatives.
The risk of "uncontrolled reentry" into Earth's atmosphere
is one disturbing aspect of any program that involves space
launches of nuclear materials. On November 17, 1996, a Russian
space probe bound for Mars malfunctioned and crashed back to
Earth, landing in the Pacific Ocean near Chile. 110 It is not known
whether the half-pound of plutonium on board was dispersed in
the atmosphere, where it may do harm as an airborne toxin, or
remained with the spacecraft, where it may persist under water
for 2,000 years."' As of 1992, six Russian nuclear missions had
failed.112 As of 1991, the United States had launched a total of
twenty-five nuclear power sources; of these launches, four
failed." 3 In one of those incidents, on April 21, 1964, the
"launch vehicle was destroyed after failing to achieve orbit;" the
plutonium metal fuel was ejected over the West Indian Ocean
and dispersed over the upper atmosphere. 114 In two incidents
the nuclear fuel sank into the ocean, and in the fourth "[t]he sat-
ellite was subsequently boosted into a higher orbit to ensure suf-
ficient radioactive decay prior to reentry."115 In October 1997,
NASA is planning the launch of a mission to Saturn that will
109 57 Fed. Reg. 4191 (1992).
110 Michael R. Gordon, Mystery of Russian Spacecraft: How Did it Fall Back
to Earth?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1996, at A13.
111 Karl Grossman & Judith Long, Nuclear Roulette, NATION, Dec. 16, 1996,
at 6.
112 Id. Among the failed Russian nuclear missions was the 1978 re-entry into
Earth's atmosphere of the radar surveillance satellite Cosmos-954. Carrying a
nuclear reactor fueled with enriched uranium, the satellite vaporized in Cana-
dian airspace, leaving a trail of radioactive debris scattered across northern
Canada. Karl-Heinz Bocksteiger, Case Law on Space Activities, in SPACL, LAWv:
DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE 206 (Nandasiri Jasentuliyana ed., 1992).
113 John W. Lawrence, Nuclear Power Source in Space: A Historical Review,
NUCLEAR NEWS, Nov. 1991; at 85.
114 Id.
115 Id. See also Chris Bryson, How Safe Are Nuclear-Powered Space Mis-
sions?, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Dec. 17, 1996; David L. Chandler, Mars 96
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involve over seventy-two pounds of plutonium. The EIS for that
project reported that an inadvertent reentry to Earth's atmos-
phere could mean in a worst case scenario that approximately
five billion of the estimated seven to eight billion world popula-
tion could receive radiation exposure, with 2,300 resulting
injuries." t6
All of these incidents involved nuclear power systems for
spacecraft. There have also been several dozen accidents with
nuclear weapons, known as "broken arrows." These have in-
cluded the crash (and one midair collision) of planes carrying nu-
clear bombs; the accidental dropping of nuclear bombs (some of
which have still not been found); the crash of an airplane into a
nuclear bomb storage facility; and explosions in missile silos and
on board nuclear-armed ships. In several of these "broken ar-
rows," the conventional explosives that formed part of the
bombs' detonation devices blew up, killing people nearby
(mostly servicemen) and causing localized radioactive contami-
nation.' In none of these incidents did a nuclear detonation
OCCur. 1 17
The EIS for a full NEO program should give at least some
consideration to various worst-case scenarios. Such scenarios-a
six kilometer wide asteroid crashing undetected into the Earth,
the misfire of a nuclear deflection system, causing pieces of an
exploded asteroid to impact, or the use of such a system by ter-
rorists, to catalogue some of the more gruesome examples-are
all remote possibilities and are difficult to predict. The CEQ's
regulations on the consideration of the worst case in an EIS re-
quire only that the EIS address "reasonably foreseeable" envi-
ronmental risks. 18 "Reasonably foreseeable," as defined in the
regulations, "includes impacts which have catastrophic conse-
quences, even if their probability of occurrence is low, proVided
that the analysis of the impacts is supported by credible scientific
Failure Renews Concern About Plutoniun-Caryihg Spacecraft, BoSToN
GLOBE, Dec. 9, 1996, at C1.
116 See generally SOLAR SYSTFm EXPLORATION DIVISION, NATIONAL A-RO.
NAUTICS & SPACE ADMINISTRATION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATE.
MENT FOR THE CASSINI MISSION (1995).
117 ANN MARIE CUNNINGHAM & MARIANA FITZPATRICK, FtrruRE FIRE:
WEAPONS FOR THE APOCALYPSE 205 (1983); CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL Ac.
CIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES 283-84 (1984). See gener-
ally Scotr D. SAGAN, THE Lixmrs OF SAFETY. ORGANIZATIONS, ACCIDEn'S
AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1993).
118 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1996).
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evidence, is not based on pure conjecture, and is within the rule
of reason." 119 Events that have an extremely low probability of
occurrence do not require lengthy consideration in an EIS; how-
ever, they should be acknowledged.
Exemption from NEPA is available if the government would
be required to quickly respond to an emergency. The exemp-
tions will most likely apply to long-period comets. As discussed
in Part I, asteroids and short-period comets are generally slower
and more predictable, and can therefore be detected earlier 120
CEQ regulations exempt agencies from NEPA review in emer-
gency circumstances, 12' but the exemption applies only to the ac-
tivities necessary to respond to the emergency, and requires
consultation with the CEQ.122
Another potential exemption from the NEPA public review
process springs from national security concerns. Documentation
of the environmental review process related to new weapons sys-
tems is often kept secret. As illustrated by the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii,123
NEPA's decision-making and public disclosure requirements are
distinct. The plaintiffs in Weinberger claimed the Navy was re-
quired to prepare an EIS with respect to the proposed use of
facilities to store nuclear weapons. 24 The Court held that, while
the Navy might be required to prepare an EIS for internal pur-
poses, the Navy was not required to make the EIS public.,12
Public disclosure is required under NEPA by specific reference
to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),12 6 which provides
that matters critical to the national defense can be protected
from disclosure by Executive Order.127 Much information re-
lated to nuclear weapons has been classified as secret pursuant to
Executive Order. 28
119 Id. § 1502.22(b).
120 However, planning a response to any type of large extraterrestrial object
on its way towards Earth could take several months or more, which may alter
the time frame of what we would normally consider an "emergency."
121 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 (1996).
122 Id.
123 454 U.S. 139, 143 (1981).
124 Id. at 142.
125 Id. at 146.
126 42 U.S.C. § 4432(2)(c) (1994).
127 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1994).
128 MANDELKER, supra note 100, § 5.03(7).
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The national security exemption from NEPA disclosure is
grounded in concerns about secrecy. Maintaining the secrecy of
nuclear technology is certainly justified with respect to the tech-
nology's technical details, even in relation to a planetary defense
program, because there is a legitimate concern that the publica-
tion of too much information may enable the wrong people to
build nuclear weapons. However, since the "enemy" in this sce-
nario is flying pieces of rock, rather than a sentient being with
the ability to formulate a counterstrategy, secrecy with respect to
the existence of a planetary defense program and its basic con-
tours may be difficult to justify.
Many aspects of a planetary defense program would deserve
consideration under NEPA. Because NEPA establishes proce-
dures rather than benchmark standards of environmental per-
formance, however, even a project with some environmental
impacts would be allowed to proceed if the impacts were fully
disclosed in the EIS and the sponsoring agency had considered
the potential environmental impacts adequately in its decision-
making process.
C. Peripheral Issues
The actual occurrence df a catastrophic NEO event-i.e.,
one causing substantial or total destruction of a particular geo-
graphic area or of the planet's ability to sustain life-raises a host
of interesting, though not entirely legal, issues.
1. Insurance Coverage
Well-insured readers will be happy to know that local dam-
age caused by an asteroid or comet is likely to be covered by a
general umbrella policy. While general property insurance poli-
cies tend to cover only such pedestrian natural disasters as fire,
hail, or wind damage, 129 broader umbrella policies often cover
both imaginable and unimaginable sources of damage. 30 Of
course, the ability of the world's insurance companies to pay all
of the claims resulting from a global catastrophe is another
matter.
129 10A MARKXS. RHODES, COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 42.1 (rev. ed. 1982).
130 16 id § 62:69; 8A JOHN A. APPL~iAN & JEAN APPLF-NiAN, INsuRANCE
Lmv AND PRAc-ncE § 4909.85 (1981).
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2. Selection for Survival
Assuming that detection of an approaching NEO allowed
time to eva6uate a small number of people from the planet, how
would we decide who was to survive? Or, to turn the tables, if
destruction of a NEO required a one-way "kamikaze" mission,
who would be on that spacecraft? The supply of volunteers
would likely be greater for the former mission than the latter, but
both are at bottom not legal questions.
3. Detection Difficulties
One practical reason for stepping up the current rate of
NEO detection is that detection from the Earth may in the future
become more difficult, in spite of technological advances. Some
astronomical observatories, once isolated from the impacts of
city lights and radio signals, are now finding that light and noise
pollution are reducing telescope visibility.131 The largest
telescopes have increasingly had to move away from populated
areas to remote locations such as Hawaii and mountainous in-
land areas. As sources of optical and radio interference-street
and house lights, garage door openers, cellular phones, small ap-
pliances-increase, some astronomers postulate (presumably in




A planetary defense program, whether unilateral or multi-
lateral, would implicate international treaties related to outer
space, environmental protection, and arms control. Part IV dis-
cusses the most relevant treaties-the Outer Space Treaty, the
Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the
Space Objects Liability Convention-and addresses other factors
affecting international cooperation in this area.
As discussed in Part I, there are many technologies that
might be used to deflect or destroy asteroids and comets, includ-
ing nuclear weapons, pulsed lasers, kinetic energy, mass drivers,
and solar sails. Because several of these technologies involve nu-
131 Malcolm W. Browne, City Lights and Space Ads May Blind Stargazers,
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1993, at C2.
132 Id.
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clear power and because nuclear warheads are the only item on
the list believed to be powerful enough to move the larger ob-
jects,133 this discussion focuses on the legal implications of the
use of nuclear technology in responding to NEOs.
The international community has begun to endorse the idea
that a NEO detection and response system should be conducted
on an international basis. For example, citing the Tunguska inci-
dent, the comet Shoemaker-Levy 9, and the possibility that a
NEO impact could be mistaken for a nuclear explosion resulting
in international havoc, the Council of Europe passed a resolution
in March 1996, encouraging member states to fund international
efforts to detect NEOs. 34 Furthermore, in 1995, a three day
U.N. conference was devoted to NEO detection and the policy
issues related to NEO response systems. 135
A. Applicable Treaty Law
1. Outer Space Treaty
The basic principles governing international activities in
outer space were established by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.1 36
Adopted by over 100 nations, the Outer Space Treaty provides
that, like the high seas and the Antarctic,. outer space is not sub-
ject to the sovereign jurisdiction of any nation, but rather may be
exploited by all nations. This principle departs from the terra
nullus concept historically applied to terrestrial land masses, per-
133 Ahrens & Harris, supra note 17, at 923; Hammerling & Remo, supra note
12.
134 Council of Europe, Resolution on the Detection of Asteroids and Comets
Potentially Dangerous to Mankind (visited Mar. 20, 1996) <httpJlcfa-
ww.harvard.edu/-marsden/SGF/resol.html>.
135 See generally John L. Remo, United Nations Conference on Near-Earth
Objects, 5 EARTH SPACE REV. 16 (1996).
136 Treaty on Principles Governing the Ativities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered
into force Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. A separate agree-
ment relating to the Moon entered into force in 1984. This agreement, how-
ever, has only eight signatories, none of whom possess major space capabilities.
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, G.A. Res. 68, U.N. GAOR. 34$
Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/68 (1979), 18 I.L.M. 1434 (entered into force
July 11, 1984) [hereinafter Moon Agreement]. The Moon Agreement provides
that the moon and other celestial bodies (as to which there are no separate
agreements) shall be used only for peaceful purposes and that lunar resources
shall be shared equally.
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mitting one state to obtain jurisdiction over an area by occupying
it. 37 Related to this treatment of outer space as the "province of
all mankind" is the idea that outer space should be used only for
peaceful purposes. 138 As discussed below, these principles, and
the accompanying restrictions on activities in space, make inter-
national cooperation critical to the success of a NEO response
program.
Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty provides that state par-
ties shall not place into orbit around the Earth nuclear weapons
or other weapons of mass destruction, and will not install such
weapons on celestial bodies or station such weapons in outer
space-in any other manner. While chemical and biological weap-
ons were considered by the Outer Space Treaty's negotiators to
be weapons of mass destruction,139 there is some debate as to
whether nuclear-powered lasers are in that category. 140 The ban
on placing such weapons in orbit, installing them on celestial
bodies, or stationing them in outer space was intended to protect
nations from space-based threats by other nations, and did not
anticipate threats originating in outer space.
Article IV provides further that no State party may test any
type of weapon on any celestial body.141 This categorical ban
would prevent any signatory from testing any NEO destruction
system even on the smallest, most remote asteroid. Also banned
are the establishment of military bases and installations and the
137 See Grier C. Raclin, From Ice to Ether: The Adoption of a Regime to
Govern Resource Exploitation in Outer Space, 7 Nw. J. INrr'L L. & Bus. 727,733
(1986). The Outer Space Treaty seeks to capture the benefits of outer space for
all mankind. While space colonization remains relegated to science fiction, the
idea still sparks interest. If space exploration and permanent space installations
become more common, the principle of cooperation may become more difficult
to implement. In the future, it may be necessary to develop more specific rules
governing space activities, perhaps modelled on the U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea. See generally id. at 739-42 (analogizing the Moon 'reaty to the
Law of the Sea); Fred Kosmo, The Commercialization of Space: A Regulatory
Scheme that Promotes Commercial Ventures and International Responsibility, 61
S. CAL. L. REv. 1055 (1988) (preparing a model system to promote American
commercialization of space); Heidi Keefe, Making the Final Frontier Feasible:
A Critical Look at the Current Body of Outer Space Law, 11 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 345 (1995) (assessing flaws in current outer
space legal regime).
138 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 136, preambles.
139 JOZEF GOLDBLAT, ARMS CONTROL: A GUIDE TO NEGOTIATIONS AND
AGREEMENrS 119 (1994).
14a Bocksteiger, supra note 112, at 147.
141 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 136, art. IV.
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"conduct of military maneuvers" on any celestial body.142 The
only type of military activity in outer space that is not clearly
prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty is activity that: (1) does
not come into contact with any celestial bodies and (2) does not
involve the installation of weapons of mass destruction in outer
space. The passage through space of weapons of mass destruc-
tion on their way back to Earth, without making a full orbit,
would be permitted. The launch of a ballistic missile from one
country to another via outer space is therefore not prohibited.
Presumably, also, the installation in outer space of weapons that
are not characterized as "weapons of mass destruction" would
also be permitted. While, as described above, there is no univer-
sal agreement about what is included in the definition of "weap-
ons of mass destruction," most weapons powerful enough to
move a large asteroid are likely to qualify (though solar sails or
reflectors, for instance, might not).
2. Partial Test Ban Treaty
Any testing of a nuclear planetary defense system would
also violate the multilateral 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty,143
which prohibits nuclear weapon test explosions and any other
type of nuclear explosion anywhere in outer space that is under
the "jurisdiction or control" of the party conducting the explo-
sion. The "other type of nuclear explosion" provision was in-
cluded to prevent circumvention of the treaty and to avoid the
need to differentiate between military and civilian uses. 144 The
phrase "under its jurisdiction or control" was intended to extend
the ban to non-self-governing territories, but not to territories
under hostile control. 45 In other words, the Treaty does not on
its face prevent explosions in enemy territory during armed hos-
tilities. A good argument could be made that an asteroid or
comet threatening the Earth is not under the "jurisdiction or con-
trol" of any nation, and therefore that the detonation of nuclear
weapons would not be prohibited by the letter of the Treaty.14"
142 Id
143 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space
and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Partial Test Ban
Treaty].
144 GOLDBLAT, supra note 139, at 41.
145 Id
146 This conclusion does not reach the threshold question of whether the use
of nuclear weapons violates a basic principle of international law, or whether
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'Barring an imminent threat (one that would be analogous to a
hostile attack), testing of a nuclear planetary defense system on
such an object would clearly violate the Partial Test Ban Treaty.
3. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
The bilateral 1972 Ahti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty lim-
its the testing and deployment of "systems to counter strategic
ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory. ' 147 The
ABM Treaty grew out of the notion that effective deterrence re-
quired mutual vulnerability to a second-strike attack.1 48 The
United States or the Soviet Union would only be deterred from
attacking if it did not have the ability to repel a counterattack.
The ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deploy-
ment of ABM systems which are sea-based, air-based, space-
based, or mobile-land based. Each party was allowed only two
fixed ABM sites, one to defend the nation's capital, the other to
defend an ICBM complex.1 49 The Treaty also prohibited the
transfer of ABM technology to other states.
Compliance with the Treaty was relatively good until the es-
tablishment of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) under Pres-
ident Reagan in 1983.150 SDI was a space-based anti-ballistic
missile program intended to provide full protection for the
United States against a Soviet nuclear attack. U.S. officials now
agree that SDI, if implemented, would have violated the ABM
Treaty. 151 The Soviet Union never challenged SDI in its design
and testing stages, and it was never deployed. The program has
since. been renounced by the Clinton administration in favor of a
strategy that protects the United States from an unexpected nu-
such use would be viewed as justified in a particular circumstance. See Interna-
tional Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat of Use
of Nuclear Weapons, July 8, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 809 (holding that there is no per se
prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons in international law).
147 United States-Soviet Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems, May 26, 1972, art. II, 11 I.L.M. 784 [hereinafter ABM Treatyj.
148 See, e.g., PAUL ROGERS & MALCOLM DANDO, A VIOLENT P13AC12:
GLOBAL SECURITY AFTER THE COLD WAR 163 (1992).
149 GOLDBLAT, supra note 139, at 55.
150 Id. at 55-57. See also Major John E. Parkerson, Jr., International Legal
Implications of the Strategic Defense Initiative, 116 MIL. L. REv. 67 (1987).
151 GOLDBLAT, supra note 139, at 57-58. At the time, representatives of the
U.S. Government argued that the Treaty was ambiguous and that systems based
on new technologies were not covered. See United States: Statements on
ABM Interpretation, Oct. 22, 1985-Dec. 1, 1986, 26 I.L.M. 282 (1987).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
[Volume 6
ASTEROIDS AND COMETS
clear attack by a renegade terrorist state.152 While a planetary
defense system would not be a "system to counter strategic bal-
listic missiles" and therefore its deployment would not be prohib-
ited, the legal challenge would be distinguishing between a
system designed to protect against asteroids and a system di-
rected at missiles. It might therefore be difficult for either the
United States or Russia 53 to develop a planetary defense system
unilaterally without risking apparent violation of the ABM
Treaty.
4. Space Objects Liability Convention
The 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects (Liability Convention) 154 establishes
the principle that a launching State is absolutely liable for dam-
age to the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight caused by
objects launched into space.155 For this purpose, a "launching
State" includes not only the state from whose territory a space
object is launched, but also any state that launches or "procures
the launching" of a space object. 56 If a launch conducted as part
of a widely ratified planetary defense program failed and caused
damage in a state that had not ratified the program, all partici-
pating states might be deemed to be launching States and might
therefore be liable to the non-participating state jointly and sev-
erally.157 The Liability Convention establishes a dispute resolu-
tion system that mandates non-binding arbitration via a Claims
Commission 58 in the event that the parties cannot come to an
agreement about compensation through diplomatic channels.
The Liability Convention also provides that damages are to
be" determined "in accordance with international law and the
principles of justice and equity."' 59 It is possible that the Claims
Commission might take the view that a planetary defense pro-
gram benefits all nations and might therefore allocate liability for
152 GOLDBLAT, supra notd 139, at 58.
153 Russia succeeded the Soviet Union as a signatory to the ABM Treaty.
Recent Actions Regarding Treaties To Which The United States Is Not A Party,
Apr. 30, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 929 (1993).
154 24 U.S.T. 2389 (1972).
155 Id, art. II.
156 Id, art. I.
1W7 Id, art. V.
158 The arbitration is binding if the parties so elect in advance. Id. art. XIV.
159 IdA, art. XII.
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related accidents equally. The idea that nations supporting a
planetary defense program are essentially good samaritans com-
ing to the aid of the'entire planet might also (absent any gross
negligence) support a more equal sharing of liability.
The one real test of the Liability Convention's procedures
came in 1979. Canada invoked the Liability Convention after
spending six milliori dollars to conduct clean-up activities in the
wake of the 1978 crash of the Soviet satellite Cosmos-954 in Ca-
nadian territory. The parties eventually signed a protocol settling
the matter, withii which the Soviet Union agreed to pay Canada
approximately three million dollars (Canadian). 160
Damages from failed launches have thus far been limited.
Debris from exploded comets or asteroids entering the Earth's
atmosphere can cause massive damage. Under the Liability Con-
vention, nations might be responsible for any damage caused in
other parts of the world as a result of either the testing or deploy-
ment of a planetary defense system. A good argument, however,
can be made that incidental (even if massive) damage is an excus-
able collateral effect of a mission that is necessary to protect
against even greater destruction.
B. Testing Versus Deployment Under International Treaty Law
The Outer Space Treaty was clearly concerned with protect-
ing the Earth from threats of an Earthly origin and did not con-
template the need to use weapons to protect the Earth from
potential impacts by asteroids or comets. Similarly, neither the
Partial Test Ban Treaty nor the ABM Treaty were meant to ad-
dress threats other than those originating from other nations.
While a program to test the planetary defense system by, for ex-
ample, exploding distant asteroids would violate the letter of the
Outer Space Treaty and the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the issue of
whether this violation would result in international legal sanc-
tions (such as the imposition of a trade embargo or other multi-
lateral action), or even the disapproval of other nations, is a
separate question.
The reaction of the international community would depend
in part on its view of the genuineness of the testing effort. It is
doubtful, in the face of an imminent hazard, that any nation
would object to the testing of a program designed for the sole
160 For a discussion of this incident, see Bocksteiger, supra note 112, at 206.
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purpose of protecting the planet. On the other hand, objections
would likely arise if other nations felt that a planetary defense
program was a pretext for otherwise prohibited weapons testing
or if the test was seen to pose unacceptable Earth-based risks
such as those associated with launch failure. It is also likely that,
absent an imminent threat, some preservationists might be con-
cerned about destroying or damaging celestial objects or gener-
ally causing outer space pollution.
The reaction of other nations would also be influenced by
which nation was conducting the testing. If a small state with a
developing nuclear program were to start conducting unilateral
tests on asteroids, the international community might view the
activity as an attempt to improve the state's nuclear program for
defense or aggression. If, on the other hand, the United States
and Russia were to commence joint testing of a planetary de-
fense program, the international community might be less suspi-
cious of the motive. In any event, the fact that no less than two
international treaties prohibit the meaningful testing of a plane-
tary defense program underscores the importance of obtaining
international consensus on the issue before the commencement
of any such program, particularly in the absence of an
emergency.
Neither the Partial Test Ban Treaty nor the Outer Space
Treaty expressly prohibit the launch of ballistic missiles carrying
nuclear weapons heading towards a hostile nation. But either
could be interpreted to prohibit any nuclear explosion in space;
this is not because the drafters of these treaties would have in-
tended such an interpretation, but rather because they did not
envision the need to respond to a NEO threat. However, it is
persuasive to argue that if a rapidly approaching NEO were
sighted, the United States should be able to invoke the justifica-
tion of self-defense, the right to which is codified in the U.N.
Charter,161 in support of a decision to launch a nuclear missile.
Many view self-defense as an inherent and autonomous right ex-
isting independently of any positive law162 and therefore super-
seding obligations under positive law.
161 U.N. CHARTER art. 51.'
162 See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in 'and Against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14, 94 (June 27) ("It is hard to see how [self-
defense] can be other than of a customary nature, even if its present content has
been confirmed and influenced by the Charter."). See generally Oscar
Schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule of Law, 83 Am. J. INT'L L. 259 (19S9);
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The justification of self-defense is stronger in the NEO 'con-
text than the more typical scenario, where self-defense is used to
justify aggression against another nation. Successful planetary
defense is, assuming the mission is successful, a victimless activ-
ity, harming no one and causing no violation of another nation's
sovereignty. This is quite different from the situation where a
nation invades another nation, kills people, and claims self-de-
fense.163 Similarly, "humanitarian intervention" to save others
from a NEO impact requires less justification (again, assuming
that the mission is successful and does not otherwise risk human
life) than a humanitarian mission that involves the invasion of
another country.164 These rationales for a planetary defense mis-
sion should, therefore, be readily available to counter arguments
about arms control treaty violations in an emergency situation.
In the absence of testing, great physical uncertainties would
surround a defense mission. Would calculations about the flight
paths of the missiles and the comet prove correct? Would the
blast be of a magnitude and nature sufficient to destroy the
comet or move it out of our way? What is the best place (for
example, above, below, or on the object) to detonate the
weapon? Would the explosion send comet fragments hurtling to-
wards the Earth? Of course, many of these questions would be
unanswerable even with extensive outer space testing of response
systems-the precise path of a comet is often unpredictable, the
composition of any particular object may be different from what
was anticipated, and we may not be able to model accurately all
the forces at work on objects in space.
The Outer Space Treaty's goal of fostering cooperation
among nations in the exploration of outer space may provide a
David R. Penna, The Right to Self-Defense in the Post-Cold War Era: The Role
of the United Nations, 20 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 41 (1993).
163 Self-defense was claimed'in the following instances, among others: Ku-
wait's response to Iraqi invasion; U.S. military actions in Nicaragua and Gre-
nada; the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan; Israeli attacks on Palestinian camps
in Jordan; and Argentina's intervention in the Falkland Islands. See Schachter,
supra note 162, at 265.
164 Unilateral missions characterized as humanitarian rescue missions (with
varying degrees of agreement by the international community) have included
the following: Israel's 1976 rescue mission at a Ugandan airport; France's 1979
intervention in the Central African Republic; and India's 1971 intervention in
Pakistan. Steve G. Simon, The Contemporary Legality of Unilateral Humanita-
rian Intervention, 24 CAL. W. INTL. L.J. 117, 145-49 (1993). Many other such
missions have, of course, been conducted on a multilateral basis under the aus-
pices of the United Nations.
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rationale for a global effort to address NEO threats. The Outer
Space Treaty provides that
States Parties to the Treaty shall regard astronauts as envoys
of mankind in outer space and shall render them all possible
assistance in the event of accident.... States Parties... shall
immediately inform the other States Parties... of any phe-
nomena they discover in outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, which could constitute a danger to ...
astronauts. 16
5
The parties either did not envision a situation in which a ce-
lestial body might constitute a danger to the Earth itself or
thought the possibility too remote to include in the Outer Space
Treaty. The parties, however, did see the Outer Space Treaty as
the framework for global cooperation in space efforts, including
protection against space-based threats to humans. In the face of
a threat to survival, the fact that the right to national self-defense
is codified in the U.N. Charter,166 and is accepted as part of cus-
tomary international law, provides a legal rationale-as if any
were needed-for the international community not to see the
Outer Space Treaty and the Partial Test Ban Treaty as impedi-
ments to a planetary defense program.
To the extent that a planetary defen se program includes the
expansion or continuation of nuclear weapons development, it
might also violate both the letter and the spirit of the Partial Test
Ban Treaty, one of the stated objectives of which is to "put an
end to the, contamination of man's environment by radioactive
substances."'167 It is also possible that other arms control trea-
ties-such as the bilateral Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms (START 1)168 and the Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty169-could be implicated if new or additional nuclear
weapons technology were necessary, or if nations without nu-
clear weapons capability wished to participate in the planetary
defense program. START I limited the number and types of nu-
clear weapons that the United States and the former Soviet
165 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 136, art. V. International obligations to
protect astronauts were expanded by the 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of
Astronauts. Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into
Outer Space, Dec. 3, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570.
166 U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
167 Partial Test Ban Treaty, supra note 144, preamble.
168 Treaty on Reduction and Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms, July 31,
1991, 31 I.L.M. 246 (1992).
169 Non-Proliferation Treaty, July 1, 1968 7 LL.M. 809.
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Union were permitted to maintain and test. It is possible that the
development of new weapons might either be prohibited under
START I or might displace weapons in a certain START I
category.
The 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty170 prevents the transfer
to or the development by non-nuclear states of a nuclear weap-
ons program. The nuclear powers agreed in exchange to pursue
disarmament talks "in good faith.' ' 71 The bargain struck be-
tween the nuclear and the non-nuclear states also included posi-
tive assurances that the nuclear states would come to the aid of
the non-nuclear states in the event of a nuclear attack.172 Pre-
sumably, non-nuclear states would want some similar assurances
in the event of the development of a nuclear planetary defense
system, to the effect that such a system would not be used for
Earth-based attacks and would be used in the unlikely event of a
NEO threat headed only toward a non-nuclear state.
C. Environmental Issues
Space launches are accompanied by certain environmental
impacts that may, in the aggregate, be significant enough to im-
plicate international treaty obligations. The greatest atmospheric
damage connected with rocket exhaust probably occurs in the
upper atmosphere, where the very thin air prevents released
gases from mixing or dispersing easily. As noted above, while
rocket fuel has been connected to ozone layer depletion, further
study is needed to determine the effect of rocket launches and
space activity in general on atmospheric pollution.173 Launches
associated with anti-NEO defense, however, would only be a
small fraction of all space launches, and therefore would not be
likely to contribute significantly to any atmospheric degradation.
The Outer Space Treaty provides that parties shall "conduct
exploration of [celestial bodies] so as to avoid their harmful con-
tamination."'174 While "harmful contamination" is not defined,
this provision contemplates the preservation of celestial bodies in
their natural state and is certainly inconsistent with blowing up or
170 Id.
171 Id., art. VI.
172 U.N. Security Council Resolution 255 on Security Assurances to Non-Nu-
clear Weapons States, June 19, 1968, S/RES/255.
173 See supra text accompanying notes 95 to 98.
174 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 136, art. IX.
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irradiating asteroids or comets.175 Existing international envi-
ronmental law' 76 and the Liability Convention' 77 also support
the principle that nations have an obligation not to pollute outer
space.
Debris left in orbit from space activities currently poses
some risks to space launches and to satellites and this will likely
continue to increase.' T7 Eventually, specific guidelines should be
created by the international community.179 In the meantime, the
architects of any planetary defense program should keep in mind
the goal of minimizing space debris. This is a further reason to
minimize testing or, if necessary, to carry it out if possible in loca-
tions that are so remote that any resulting debris (except, of
course, that from a failed launch) would not threaten human
activities.
To the extent that any planetary defense program employs
nuclear power in its propulsion (as opposed to nuclear weapons),
the U.N. General Assembly Resolution and Principles Relevant
to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space ("Nuclear
175 For purposes of this analysis, we could assume that "harmful contamina-
tion" means anything that damages the surface, integrity, or atmosphere (if
any) of the celestial body or, in the alternative, anything that humans would
find harmful.
176 Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment
provides that "[s]tates have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions and the principles of international law... the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the envi-
ronment... of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." Declaration of
the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972, 11
I.L.M. 1416. The use of the phrase "jurisdiction and control" from the Outer
Space Treaty suggests that Principle 21 may apply to outer space as well as to
Earth. Lawrence D. Roberts, Addressing the Problem of Orbital Space Debris:
Combining International Regulatory and Liability Regimes, 15 B.C. L,-'L &
Comp. L. Rv. 51, 66 (1992). The extent of the "environment," however, re-
li]ains an open question.
177 See supra note 155.
178 A United Nations status report on space debris reported that as of 19S8
there were approximately 7,000 man-made objects larger than 20 centimeters in
size in near-Earth orbit, most of which are fragments of launched objects.
Bocksteiger, supra note 112, at 163 (citing Space Debris: A Status Report, Com-
mittee on Space Research Annex, U.N. Doc. AIAC.105/403 (Jan. 6, 1988).
179 See generally Glenn H. Reynolds, Space Law in the 1990s: An Agenda for
Research, 31 JujmEIcs J. 1 (1991); Roberts, supra note 176; Major Bernard
K. Schafer, U.S.A.F., Solid, Hazardous, and Radioactive Wastes in Outer Space.
Present Controls and Suggested Changes, 19 CAL. W. l'L LJ. 1 (1988).
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Power Principles")' 80 will be implicated. While resolutions of the
General Assembly are non-binding, 181 the Nuclear Power Princi-
ples were the result of twenty years of negotiations by the U.N.
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and
represent an important step in the evolving outer space legal re-
gime. 182 The Nuclear Power Principles provide that "nuclear
power sources in outer space shall be restricted to those space
missions which cannot be operated by non-nuclear energy
sources in a reasonable way."183 While not an absolute prohibi-
tion, the Nuclear Power Principles require serious consideration
of alternative energy sources. With respect to the risk of radia-
tion exposure, the Nuclear Power Principles provide that "the de-
sign and use of space objects with nuclear power sources on
board shall ensure, with a high degree of confidence, that the
hazards, in foreseeable operational or accidental circumstances,
are kept below acceptable levels .... ,184 The record of past nu-
clear-powered space launches suggests that such assurances are
difficult to provide.
D. Multilateral Action
The potential for some type of accident or misuse of a test-
ing program suggests that the least risky option at present (both
physically and legally) is to create only a global detection system.
Such a system would cost very little, compared to other similar
programs, and poses no apparent risks. If the international com-
munity decides to proceed with the design and testing of a plane-
tary defense system, in spite of evidence demonstrating that it
may be safer to concentrate on detecting NEOs and worry about
deflecting them later if a threatening object is found,' the effort
should be multilateral and should be accompanied by an agree-
ment to exculpate the launching country, if the launching country
is acting with reasonable care and with the consent of all parties.
With regard to the deployment of a planetary defense sys-
tem against an imminent threat, the potentially catastrophic re-
180 General Assembly Resolution and Principles Relevant to the Use of Nu-
clear Power Sources in Outer Space, Dec. 14, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 917 [hereinafter
Nuclear Power Principles].
181 U.N. CHARTER art. 10, &l.
182 See Carl Q. Christol, Introduction to Nuclear Power Principles, supra
note 180, 32 I.L.M. at 917.
183 Nuclear Power Principles, supra note 180, 32 I.L.M. at 922.
18 Id.
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sults of a NEO impact would render any concerns about
international liability trivial in comparison and therefore irrele-
vant. Each nation would be motivated to respond to a potential
NEO impact in order to protect itself and, one hopes, the rest of
mankind. The international legal regime, however, should en-
courage nations to act on behalf of the planet as a whole, with
international consent where time allows.
A further rationale for a multilateral response system is that
the risks of direct NEO impacts are distributed equally around
the globe which respect to surface area.185 It may be difficult or
impossible even to predict where a comet or asteroid would land
more than a few hours or days in advance of its impact.1S6 This is
an attribute particular to threats from outer space.187
Practical reasons also support a multilateral detection effort.
International cooperation will be necessary not only to address
potential treaty violations, but also because it is impossible to
track all approaching NEOs from one continent. To achieve a
comprehensive tracking system, wide geographical coverage of
optical observatory sites is essential; both the northern and
southern hemispheres must be covered.'88 The Spaceguard Sur-
vey proposal for six detection sites worldwide, for example, in-
volves five countries. International cooperation among asteroid-
spotters is not a new idea; for years astronomers have communi-
cated their sightings to one another through the Central Bureau
for Astronomical Telegrams in Cambridge, Massachusetts. 8 9
Similarly, nations have historically cooperated in the placement
and tracking of satellites and the division of the frequency band
185 This is not true with respect to the risks of flooding by tsunamis if a large
asteroid hit the ocean. Coastal nations are at much greater risk than wholly
inland nations. For example, the UK's risk is greater than Germany's; and,
given the relative size of the bodies of water (and therefore the impact risk),
countries on the Pacific are at greater risk of tsunamis than are countries on the
Mediterranean. All nations, however, are probably at equal risk of a direct
NEO impact, proportionate to their land mass.
186 See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
187 Even climate change presents greater risks to some countries than others.
Island nations, for example, are at greater risk with respect to climate change
because melting polar ice caps might place them below sea level.
188 THE SPACEGUARD SURVEY: REPORT OF THE NASA INTERNATIONAL
NEAR-EARTH-OBJECT DETECTION WORKSHOP 8.1 (1994) <http:l/
ccf.arc.nasa.gov/sst/spaceguard.html>.
189 Sightings are reported to Central Bureau for Astronomical Telegrams and
from there are disseminated to subscribers, usually via e-mail. See, e.g., Ferris,
supra note 9, at 44.
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spectrum through the International Telecommunications Union,
a U.N. body established in 1982.190
Decision-making will of course be more difficult as more na-
tions are involved, particularly because matters of national secur-
ity are implicated. The decision to establish an international
NEO detection and tracking system should be simple, given that
the costs are relatively low and current technology could be em-
ployed. The three critical decision points are the commencement
of a planetary defense program, the decision that a particular
threat warrants its use, and the selection of how and when to use
it. While nations will certainly differ on the structure of a plane-
tary defense program, acting by consensus with full transparency
will be less likely to create international concern and possible in-
stability in response to a program that involves weapons develop-
ment and testing. If there are vehement disagreements about
proceeding with such a program, however, commencing a NEO
response testing program may cause greater detriment-in the
form of international political instability-than benefit.
The second and third critical decision points arise when an
Earth-bound NEO is discovered. Again, if time allows, interna-
tional consensus is preferable to unilateral action. The U.N, Se-
curity Council, given the mandate of settling disputes between
nations in the case of "dispute[s] ... likely to endanger the main-
tenance of international peace and security," 191 should be in-
volved if the use of weapons of mass destruction is contemplated.
If there is very little advance warning, a nation may have to re-
spond without more than perfunctory consultation with other na-
tions, perhaps through the Security Council. The "hot line"
system for communicating in the event of an accidental launch or
other emergency could be used for this purpose. After the Cu-
ban missile crisis, Moscow and Washington established the hot
line to guard against miscommunication in stressful circum-
stances and reduce the risk of a nuclear attack premised on mis-
information. The original telegraph and radio links provided 24-
hour communication ports between the two capitals. The agree-
ment was revised in 1971 to provide for more reliable satellite
links instead. Other safeguards such as the Nuclear Accidents
190 See Francis Lyall, Law of Satellite Communications, in SPACE LAv, supra
note 112, at 113.
191 U.N. CHARTER art. 34, &l.
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Agreement of 1971192 and the Prevention of Nuclear War Agree-
ment of 1973193 clarified procedures in case of emergencies or
misunderstandings.
The hot line has been used several times, mainly during mili-
tary crises such as the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1971, the
1971 Pakistan-India war, and the 1979 Soviet intervention in Af-
ghanistan. 94 In 1987, the two superpowers took the step of es-
tablishing Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in each country,
which would serve to notify the other in the case of accidental
missile deployment. A system structured like the former U.S.-
Soviet system, especially if it were expanded to include the other
members of the U.N. Security Council, which would facilitate
contact with any other nation in the event a NEO were headed in
its direction, would be sufficient to handle the exceedingly un-
likely planetary defense emergency.
E. Paying For the NEO Program
Funding an international NEO program may face some of
the roadblocks that afflict many other international efforts. De-
veloping nations focused on building infrastructure and feeding
the population may not want to allocate resources to a remote
threat. This issue was encountered in the implementation of the
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change ("Climate
Change Convention"),195 which has the goal of stabilizing or re-
ducing worldwide greenhouse gas emissions. Many developing
nations said that they would implement technologies as required
by the Climate Change Convention only if implementation were
funded largely by the wealthier, developed nations. 196 In this
case, just as in the Climate Change Convention, certain nations
may have to decide if the benefits of the NEO defense program
justify paying a disproportionate share of the costs.
192 Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War
Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Sept.
30, 1971, 10 I.L.M. 1172.
193 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of So-
viet Socialist Republics in the Prevention of Nuclear War, June 22, 1973, 12
I.L.M. 896.
194 GOLDBLAT, supra note 139, at 202.
195 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849.
196 See generally Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change: A Commentary, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Philippe Sands ed., 1994).
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Because the costs of a detection program are so low, a few
nations may not object to funding such a program largely on
their own. If one or more nations decide to proceed with the
development of a planetary defense program, the benefits of hav-
ing control of the technology, and therefore preventing its mis-
use, may outweigh the desire to share the costs with others.
The tasks of coordinating the funding, administration, and
planning of NEO detection and countermeasure programs could
be carried out by an existing organization, COPUOS, which in-
cludes delegations from all the space-faring nations and several
others. COPUOS drafted most of the existing treaties concerning
outer space, and seems to be well suited to forge new interna-
tional agreements dealing with NEOs.197
CONCLUSION
As knowledge about near-Earth objects improves, we are
learning that the risks posed to Earth by NEOs are of the same
numerical magnitude as many other risks to whose prevention
society has devoted significant money and attention. Yet the
amount of money currently devoted to NEO detection is tiny
when compared to the resources devoted to risks of similar mag-
nitude-in some cases, thousands of times lower.198
A comprehensive program for NEO detection is relatively
inexpensive and is by far the most effective way to improve the
chances that a NEO could be prevented from doing significant
damage to the Earth. Nations with astronomical capabilities
should make a commitment to provide continued funding for a
multi-year NEO detection project. The contributions required
are low in comparison to the potential benefits.
On the other hand, implementation of a planetary defense
program is much more expensive and much less likely to provide
overall global benefits. In addition to its implications under U.S.
and international law, the development of a weapons-based
NEO response program raises significant concerns regarding ac-
cidents or misuse. Any advantages of testing or deploying a nu-
clear-based NEO defense system, in the absence of a known
threat, are greatly outweighed by the dangers of creating such a
defense system.
197 See Gary L. Bennett, Reaching the Outer Planets-With or Without the
U.N., AEROSPACE Am., July 1996, at 26. See also Remo, supra note 135, at 16.
198 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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It is possible that international activity related to NEOs
might eventually reach a point where a treaty addressing the sub-
ject would be a useful way to delineate rules and respective na-
tional responsibilities. Some elements of an eventual
international agreement on detection of and response to NEOs
might be full transparency of national NEO response efforts; ex-
culpation of nations launching spacecraft as agreed and author-
ized by the international NEO program; establishment of a NEO
detection and response agency to manage the international effort
(perhaps COPUOS); formalization of information and technol-
ogy sharing processes; institution of emergency response proce-
dures to address potential NEO collisions and accidents; and
prohibition of any unilateral planetary defense program except in
the case of emergencies. Some or all of these provisions could be
included in a revision of the Outer Space Treaty.
However, the time for a treaty is a long way off. The current
priority-both in the United States and internationally-should
be establishing consistent funding for NEO detection and
tracking.
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